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Abstract
The article presents the first results of the CrySTINA project.
We analyze and structure the security problem domain in
the TINA-C architecture and present our approach to pro-
vide the necessary security functionality in the form of self-
contained application-independent security services and
security mechanisms as part of the DPE functionality. The
DPE is assumed to be basically provided by CORBA prod-
ucts. Therefore, we introduce the CORBA security specifi-
cation and investigate if and how the identified TINA secu-
rity services can be implemented using the CORBA security
functionality.
1. Introduction
An essential requirement for the Telecommunication
Information Networking Architecture (TINA) is security.
TINA is intended to provide a comprehensive architec-
ture for multi-service networks that shall enable multime-
dia communications and access to information for business
and private users. In traditional communications networks
that are solely dedicated to the telephony service, not much
attention has been paid to authenticity, integrity, and con-
fidentiality of the voice data carried. Efforts for security
have been nearly exclusively focused on the secure and safe
operation of the network itself and the protection against
toll fraud. In future multi-service networks, this situation
has to be changed. If commercially valuable interactions
shall take place over these networks, users will require au-
thenticity, integrity, and confidentiality for the information
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transmitted. The provision of security is becoming an im-
portant issue in the competition between TINA technology
and other multi-service networks, first of all the Internet.
In the Internet world, several approaches on various lay-
ers, all based on cryptography, are currently discussed or
already in use, e.g., [3] [10] [4] [26]. In order to be com-
petitive, TINA networks must guarantee at least the same
degree of security. An important field of application is elec-
tronic commerce. The Internet does not yet have a specific
architecture for electronic commerce. On the other hand,
TINA with its business model and service architecture [23]
together with the know-how and the customer base of the
established telecommunication network operators as one of
the driving forces of the TINA effort inherently possesses
the appropriate infrastructure for electronic commerce. To
benefit from this advantage, the overall architecture must
provide the functionality to protect the transactions and to
establish the legal bindings.
In order to avoid redundancy of functionality and for the
sake of interoperability, security in TINA networks has to
be provided in a consistent way. The security problem do-
main should be structured and security functionality should
be provided as much as possible through general security
services. A prerequisite for these services in a multi-party
environment, such as a TINA network, is the existence of
a security infrastructure that provides long term keys and
supports the negotiation of security mechanisms and poli-
cies between different administrative domains. The means
are mainly provided by cryptography. All application-
independent security functionality should be available from
the Distributed Processing Environment (DPE), since appli-
cation and platform independent functionality is in TINA
provided at this architectural level.
The provision of the security infrastructure is the sub-
ject of the CrySTINA (Cryptographically Secured TINA)
project, a joint research effort of the Swiss Federal Insti-
tute of Technology Lausanne, Siemens Munich, and the
Swiss Telecom. As expressed in the name, security is re-
alized mainly by cryptographic means. CrySTINA is part
of a broader research effort aiming at a Secure and Reli-
able Distributed Processing Environment for telecommu-
nication networks. This article presents the results of the
analysis phase, i.e. how the security problem domain must
be structured in order to provide security functionality as
application-independent services and how CORBA security
can be used for that purpose. It is an improved and enhanced
presentation of the analysis given in [20]. Similar to the ap-
proach stated in the technical report on the TINA security
architecture [22], we also strive to reuse established con-
cepts from other standardization work, such as OSI, TMN
and the OMG specifications.
In the following section, we analyze and structure the se-
curity problem domain in TINA. Then we investigate how
CORBA security can be used for TINA and we identify ad-
ditional security services and mechanisms that must be pro-
vided by the DPE. Section 3 presents the CORBA security
specification. In Section 4 we propose how CORBA secu-
rity may be used in TINA networks and identify the open
issues for the TINA-DPE. Finally, in Section 5 we give an
outlook on our ongoing and future work.
2. The TINA security problem domain
Security concerns all parts of a TINA system; it is perva-
sive and cannot be addressed in isolation. To cope with this
complexity, it is necessary to structure the security problem
domain in an appropriate way. All services and resources
may be the subject to attacks. Attacks may be the illegit-
imate use of components or the modification of data, state
or programs. They may occur through direct access to sys-
tems, data, or services from outside or through modification
of messages exchanged between interacting components.
Potential attackers are outsiders, but also other stakeholders
in the TINA network. Motives of attackers may be the ille-
gitimate use of services, fraud (e.g., in online businesses),
toll fraud, eavesdropping on and observation of consumers
or providers, or the deliberate prevention of service provi-
sion (denial of service attack). The ultimate goal of an at-
tack may be achieved directly or indirectly. In the latter
case, an attacker may install a backdoor during a first suc-
cessful attack, which enables him later on (and possibly at
multiple times) the actually intended misuse. Examples for
backdoors are the modification of programs or access rights.
Each stakeholder in a TINA network has his or her own
administrative domain [24]. We make the assumption that
the administrative domain is the trust domain of the stake-
holder. This assumption is based on the fact that in the reg-
ular case the installed hardware is under the physical con-
trol of the stakeholder and the software is installed by him
or herself. The trust domain may in fact consist of vari-
ous nodes under the physical control of the stakeholder that
are connected by physically unsecure communication links.
These links can be turned into secure channels by the use
of symmetric cryptography without sophisticated manage-
ment of keys, so that the connected nodes form a single trust
domain. Since TINA supports personal mobility for con-
sumers [23] [1], the current administrative domain is not
necessarily administered by the consumer currently using it.
However, in this article we do not cover the additional trust
relationship between the consumer administrative domain
and the consumer. This relationship is subject of our ongo-
ing work. In this article, we assume complete trust between
the user and his or her current administrative domain. Secu-
rity within the administrative domain (intradomain security)
is domain specific and is achieved by local means. Within
his or her domain, the stakeholder trusts in the correctness
of the installed software. Towards the outside, the adminis-
trative domain must be protected against illegitimate access.
For interactions with other domains (interdomain interac-
tions), limited trust relationships must be established. The
communication channels between domains cannot be as-
sumed to be secure. Therefore protection must be achieved
by cryptographic means. Security must be provided to all
parts of the TINA system that are involved in interdomain
interactions. The security of each part is usually dependent
on the security of many other parts in the administrative do-
main, nevertheless, all single parts have to be protected on
their own. Figure 1 shows our structuring of the security
problem domain.
System Security:
System security shall ensure that systems, mainly the hard-
ware and the operating system, are not subject to intru-
sions. This concerns networking resources (e.g., network
switches) and computing resources. It also includes the Na-
tive Computing and Communications Environment (NCCE)
(operating system and communication ports), since intru-
sions may not only occur over communication ports of the
NCCE that are used by the DPE, but also over other ports
of the NCCE. The latter point concerns mainly the adminis-
trative domains of end users (consumers) whose Customer
Premises Equipment (CPE), e.g., Personal Computers (PCs)
or workstations, cannot be assumed to be exclusively used
as the endpoint of the TINA network.
Service Security:
Service security is mainly concerned with the preservation
of the integrity of service control. Service control includes
among others the verification of whether a user is allowed
to use a service (subscription) and the accounting for billing
purposes. Both rely on the authenticated identity of the
















































Figure 1. TINA security problem domain
tication of the user. Anonymous users of a chargeable ser-
vice may be authenticated using anonymized, but charge-
able (e.g. pre-paid), identities. The authentication protocol
must guarantee that no secret authenticating information is
revealed. This can be achieved best by mutual authentica-
tion of the user and the provider. The integrity of service
control includes integrity of subscription verification and
accounting. Access to the service functionality is controlled
at two levels, the DPE level and the service level. At the
DPE level, a coarse-grained access control based on the au-
thenticated identities of the users involved in a session pre-
vents attempts by others to invoke operations of the service
components involved in the session. At the service level, the
service logic implemented in the service component con-
trols the access to service specific information and function-
ality based on the authenticated identities, context, and state
information. Integrity and confidentiality of the messages
exchanged between the service component’s operational in-
terfaces is achieved by the activation of the appropriate fea-
tures of the DPE security services. These features must pro-
vide not only the protection of the integrity of the messages
and their temporal order but also protection against inter-
ruption of the control connection itself, as we have demon-
strated in [19]. Special cases of services are management
services and special security services. Both require a poten-
tially higher degree of security (e.g., stronger authentication
mechanisms, longer cryptographic keys, or a physically bet-
ter secured DPE node for their implementation). The spe-
cial security services provide specialized security features,
e.g., digital cash support, that are not present in every DPE
node but are supported by dedicated providers (retailers or
third party service providers) at the service level. The man-
agement services are concerned with the management of
systems, services and the DPE. The security of management
services is crucial, since illegal access to management func-
tionality may be used for the implantation of backdoors. Of
particular concern is the management of the DPE, which in-
cludes the management of the DPE security services.
DPE Security:
DPE security is mainly concerned with the prevention of il-
legal access to computational objects (CO) and CO groups
as well as the protection of transmitted messages containing
arguments, results, and exceptions of object invocations and
notifications. DPE node security also provides the means to
audit and report security relevant events on the node accord-
ing to the audit specifications defined by the administrator
(see also [6] [7]). DPE security includes the security of the
DPE implementation and its basic services, such as the Ob-
ject Services in CORBA. Since our architectural placement
of security functionality allocates the general security ser-
vices and mechanisms to the DPE (see Section 4), also the
security of the security services themselves is part the secu-
rity of the DPE.
Communications Contents Security:
Communication contents security is concerned with the au-
thenticity, integrity, and confidentiality of the service con-
tents information. Since all service content information
is delivered in the form of streams, it deals only with
streams. Streams are protected using cryptographic mecha-
nisms, preferably stream ciphers [17] [18] or special ciphers
for certain information formats, e.g., voice or video data. If
the service implemented in the provider’s domain does not
require any modification of the stream between two users,
they can have end-to-end security. Otherwise, only user-
provider security can be provided. The management of the
necessary keys is part of the service control.
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3. CORBA security
The CORBA Security specification [13] has been re-
leased by the OMG to provide the model, architecture, as
well as usage and administration interfaces for security in
CORBA [12] systems. There are two levels of confor-
mance. Some features are optional. Thus, not all secure
CORBA implementations will provide the complete func-
tionality specified.
The basic notion is the secure object invocation. For each
object invocation, the request from the client object to the
target object is subject to access control by the ORB security
implementation. This access control may take place at the
client side, the target side, or on both sides. Figure 2 shows
a secure object invocation. The access is decided based on
information bound to the target object, and/or information
linked to the client object’s request. The latter information
is referred to as credentials. A credential consists of unau-
thenticated and authenticated attributes. Authenticated at-
tributes are identity and privilege attributes. This general
model enables a large variety of access control schemes,
ranging from access control lists over capabilities to label
based schemes. The scale of access control is not specified,
but it can be assumed that implementors will provide access














Figure 2. Secure object invocation
The client object acts on behalf of a principal. In most
cases, the principal is a human user. In some cases, it
may be a system entity, comparable to a system account on
UNIX computers. For an object invocation, the credentials
of the client object are contained in a dedicated credentials
object which is referenced by the object representing the
current execution context. The credentials object is created
for the principal as the result of the authentication process
of the principal.
Access control is only one of several concerns of a secure
object invocation. A secure object invocation requires a se-
curity association between client and target object. In a se-
curity association, both parties trust the claimed identity of
each other. This may require additional, mutual authentica-
tion with the creation of additional credentials, particularly
if the two objects do not reside in the same ORB system.
A security association will normally persist for many inter-
actions. Depending on the security policy, integrity and/or
confidentiality of requests and responses within a security
association may be protected by cryptographic means. For
security auditing, security relevant actions may be logged.
As an option, CORBA security implementations may pro-
vide support for non-repudiation to the applications pro-
grammer.
The CORBA security document does not specify the un-
derlying security technology itself. Instead, it defines in-
terfaces for the use and administration of the security ser-
vice(s) and interfaces to integrate security technology into
ORB implementations. In a security enhanced ORB sys-
tem, security is imposed at two levels, the administration
level and the application level. Security policies for access
control, message protection and audit are specified by the
administrator. A security policy is represented by a secu-
rity policy object. One security policy may be valid for one
or more security domains. Each security domain contains
a domain manager object which references the valid secu-
rity policy object for this domain. The affiliation of an ob-
ject to a security domain is determined by the administrator.
The respective policies are in each case enforced on the ob-
ject. At the application level, additional security measures
may be enforced by the applications themselves. This may
be done by the additional enforcement of administrator de-
fined policies and/or the direct use of security features such
as non-repudiation. The application enforced security mea-
sures cannot override administrator enforced policies.
There are four types of domains regarding security: se-
curity domains, security policy domains, security environ-
ment domains, and security technology domains. A security
domain is the domain that is administered by one authority.
A security policy domain is the scope over which a security
policy is enforced. In most cases, it is identical with the
security domain. A security environment domain is the do-
main in which the enforcement of the security policy may
be achieved by local means, e.g. objects on the same ma-
chine. A security technology domain is a set of objects for
which the same technology (e.g., Kerberos [11]) is used to
enforce the policies.
Secure interoperation between objects depends on the
membership of the objects to security technology domains,
ORB technology domains, and security policy domains. In-
teroperability between objects in different security policy
domains can only be achieved if both domains agree on a
cooperation security policy for the respective interactions.
This cooperation policy may be negotiated at invocation
time or in advance. In the simplest case, only the secu-
rity policy for the target is applied. Objects in different
ORB technology domains can, technically, interact without
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problems using the Secure Inter-ORB protocol (SECIOP)
as specified in [13], as long as the same security technology
is used on both sides. (We do not consider the gateway ap-
proach for inter-ORB-interoperability to be used in TINA.
However, the following would also apply in this case.) Ac-
cording to the CORBA security specification, interoperabil-
ity between objects in systems with different security tech-
nology requires a security technology gateway. This is ob-
viously not a trust problem if both security technology do-
mains are in the same security domain (one common se-
curity administration). It may cause trust problems if the
boundary between security domains (with different admin-
istrations) is also a boundary between security technology
domains. For instance, assume one security domain (and se-
curity technology domain using asymmetric cryptography)
providing the non-repudiation service using digital signa-
tures and another security domain (and security technology
domain using only symmetric cryptography) providing non-
repudiation using notary servers. In general, a security tech-
nology gateway cannot be realized without the administra-
tors of both security domains trusting each other or a third
party that runs the gateway. A less restrictive solution would
be to negotiate the security technology used.
The specification for secure interoperability between
ORBs extends the CORBA 2.0 standard which specifies in-
teroperability. The information which security technology
the target requires and which security mechanisms it sup-
ports is part of the interoperable object reference (IOR). The
Common Secure Interoperability Specification (CSI) by the
OMG [14] allows the protocols of three security technolo-
gies within the SECIOP, namely SPKM, Kerberos, and the
ECMA security protocol. If the interoperability between the
ORBs is based on DCE [16], the DCE security technology
based on the Kerberos protocol can also be used [13]. A
recent proposal [15] wants to allow to base inter-ORB se-
curity on the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [10]. Based on
the information in the IOR, a security context acceptable
for both sides can be determined. The establishment of the
respective security association and the protection of mes-
sages are controlled by security tokens which are added to
the Inter-ORB-Protocols. Key management is not explicitly
dealt with in the CORBA security specification.
4. Providing security for TINA
Security features in TINA are implemented at various
levels. In our approach, the DPE offers general security
services and security mechanisms1 to the applications. In
1Unlike the CORBA security specifications [13] [14], we use the term
security mechanism in the sense as introduced in the OSI security archi-
tecture [5], i.e. for an abstract mechanism that can be used to provide one
or more security services (e.g., a digital signature), but does usually not
provide all necessary security functionality for the system.
the following, we will introduce our approach for TINA se-
curity, which is based on a layered structure. Figure 3 il-
lustrates the layering. The usage relations are as follows.
DPE security services are exclusively based on the DPE se-
curity mechanisms. The implementation of these mecha-
nisms may directly use cryptographic mechanisms or may
be built on available higher level security technology, such
as Kerberos [11]. The underlying security technology may
use the same cryptographic mechanisms as the DPE secu-
rity mechanisms or proprietary implementations. The use
of cryptographic mechanisms and/or higher level security
technology may be accomplished through standardized in-
terfaces (e.g., GSS-API [2]) to facilitate the integration of











Figure 3. Layering of TINA security features
Above the DPE level, Figure 3 shows the special security
services, which also rely exclusively on the DPE security
mechanisms and services. They are used by TINA applica-
tions, but are application services themselves. The special
security services are not implemented on each DPE node.
Examples are electronic retail banking functions or notary
services.
General security functionality is offered to the applica-
tions on each node as part of the DPE functionality. To ease
integration in applications, as much functionality as possi-
ble should be provided as self-contained security services,
i.e. the application is not concerned with how the security
functionality is provided (e.g., which security mechanisms
are used and on which cryptographic mechanisms or secu-
rity technology they are based). The application is only re-
quired to use the DPE security mechanisms directly if the
handling of the security mechanisms is service specific, e.g.,
if the verification of a digital signature is directly needed.
The necessary DPE services and mechanisms must be pro-
vided by CORBA security and additional parts of the DPE
that are addressed in the CrySTINA project. In the follow-
ing, we investigate for each of the security topics introduced
in Section 2 whether CORBA security functionality is suf-
ficient and propose additional features if needed.
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System Security:
System security cannot be provided by CORBA security. It
can only be guaranteed by a proper design, implementation
and installation of the respective hardware and software as
well as the protection of communication over unsecure links
at the NCCE level. In operation, system security can be sup-
ported by auditing of security relevant events at the NCCE
level and alarm reporting in case of serious incidents.
Service Security:
Service security relies extensively on DPE security features.
In principle, the security of service control can be provided
by the use of the CORBA security services in cooperation
with the security relevant service logic. A crucial point is
the mapping of security relevant domain types defined in
the TINA-C architecture and in the CORBA architecture.
Based on observations of trial implementations of the ser-
vice architecture (e.g, [25]), we assume the mapping of each
administrative domain in TINA onto one ORB system. This
is reasonable because resulting from this mapping the in-
terface between ORBs is a protocol interface, i.e. in the
interaction with another administrative domain no poten-
tially vendor-specific executable code from the other side is
needed at the DPE level. For security reasons, we propose
the following mappings of TINA domain types to security
relevant domain types at the CORBA level:
 Each TINA administrative domain is mapped onto
one security domain. This domain is also exactly
one security policy domain. The mapping reflects
that each stakeholder (i.e. administrator of a TINA
administrative domain) has specific security interests
and limited trust in other stakeholders and that a se-
curity domain should not contain equipment that is
not under the physical control of the security author-
ity. This mapping further implies that all interdomain
interactions between service components (e.g., UAP-
USM) rely on inter-ORB security and on the negotia-
tion of a cooperation security policy.
 Each TINA administrative domain (also CORBA se-
curity domain and CORBA security policy domain)
is also one security environment domain, i.e. how the
security policy is enforced within the domain, is a lo-
cal matter.
 Each boundary between TINA administrative do-
mains is assumed to be also a boundary between se-
curity technology domains. This reflects that stake-
holders with various kinds of CPE, varying priorities
regarding security, and under possibly different na-
tional laws cannot be assumed to have the same secu-
rity technology. It requires that the security technol-
ogy used for interdomain interactions (including the
mechanisms used) is negotiated as part of the respec-
tive cooperation security policy. This may result in
the use of the same or a compatible security technol-
ogy or the use of a mutually agreed security technol-
ogy gateway.
Control of access to information and functionality at
the service level (authorization) prevents illegitimate use of
these resources within the service usage. It is based on the
identities of stakeholders and authorization information re-
garding subscriptions and access to management function-
ality. The authorization process is implemented as a part
of the service logic in the respective service components,
e.g., the User Agent (UA) for the access service as well
as the User Service Session Manager (USM) and the Ser-
vice Session Manager (SSM) for the actual telecommunica-
tions service. The authorization decisions are made inside
a service component after the invocation of an operation of
an operational interface of the service component. These
decisions rely on the authentication of the claimed identi-
ties as well as the authenticity, integrity, and (optionally)
confidentiality of the messages exchanged with the other
stakeholder. The three latter properties must be provided by
DPE services, whereas the first, i.e. the authentication of
the other stakeholder, takes place at the service level as part
of the establishment of an access session between different
stakeholders. CORBA security does not provide the nec-
essary inter-ORB inter-domain authentication service. An
additional authentication service must provide facilities for
the mutual authentication of stakeholders. This service is
used for the establishment of access sessions. Since user
mobility must be supported, the authentication technology
must be designed in such a way that the consumer does not
need to trust the equipment in the consumer domain. This
suggests the use of smart card technology. The integration
of established smart card technology can guarantee that the
owner (administrator) of the CPE (administrative domain)
used at the moment cannot learn the secret authenticating
information of the consumer.
DPE Security:
Session keys resulting from the execution of an authentica-
tion protocol at the service level may be used subsequently
at the DPE (CORBA) level to prove and verify the identity
of client objects. The session keys may also be used to pro-
vide authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality for the estab-
lished security association using CORBA inter-ORB secu-
rity. The exact security context of the security association,
i.e. which security mechanisms are used, is established at
association setup using the security tokens of the inter-ORB
protocol. The context is derived from the cooperation secu-
rity policy for the interaction between the domains, which
also includes the choice of the mechanisms and the authen-
tication servers (or public key certifiers).
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Access control at the DPE level has to prevent illegiti-
mate invocations of operations. This access control is, in
contrast to the access control at the service level (authoriza-
tion), not determined by the semantics of the service, but
by the question whether the originating stakeholder of an
attempt to invoke an operation is allowed to invoke this op-
eration at all. The only possible results of an access decision
are access permitted or access denied. Granularities are the
whole interfaces or the single operation of an interface. In
order to analyze how CORBA access control can be used,
it is necessary to study how TINA service components are
built up using CORBA. Service components are likely to
be implemented as CO groups, even though the service ar-
chitecture [23] does not prescribe the mapping of service
components onto COs or CO groups. The service compo-
nent’s interfaces are in that case provided as contracts of the
respective CO group. However, CORBA lacks the concept
of object groups. Additionally, in contrast to TINA COs,
CORBA objects have exactly one interface. We assume that
each TINA CO is implemented as a set of CORBA objects
and that each CO interface is implemented as a dedicated
CORBA object, as proposed in [9]. The service compo-
nent’s interfaces (the contracts of the group) are, thus, pro-
vided as the CORBA interfaces of those CORBA objects
that implement the CO interfaces that serve as contracts.
Potentially, the operations of all CORBA interfaces are
accessible to everyone who has access to the kernel trans-
port network that connects the single ORB systems. How-
ever, only few of these interfaces shall be accessible by ob-
jects acting for other stakeholders, i.e. shall be accessible
for another identity than the one of the administrative do-
main (the owner) the object is allocated to. These interfaces
are implementations of those interfaces of service compo-
nents that are part of an interdomain reference point. Ac-
cess to all other CORBA interfaces must be restricted to
those objects that act under the same identity. This is easily
achieved by ORB-local access control.
Access control for the objects that are indeed part of an
interdomain reference point is more complex. However, our
observation is that the functionality offered across domain
boundaries is always structured as interfaces so that each
instance of an operational interface is dedicated to exactly
one other stakeholder, as suggested in [9]. As long as this
observation holds, identity based access control can be ap-
plied at the granularity of service component interfaces, i.e.
at the CORBA level to the whole object implementing the
interface of the respective service component and can be re-
alized by simply checking authenticity and integrity of the
message conveying the invocation request. If the observa-
tion above does not hold, two cases with different granu-
larities can be distinguished. If an interface of a service
component is accessed by various stakeholders, but with the
same rights, the unit of access control can also be the whole
interface. On the other hand, if an interface is accessed by
various stakeholders with different rights, the unit is the sin-
gle operation of the interface. In both cases, access control
should be supported by a list bound to each unit of access
control that contains the identities of the stakeholders that
are authorized to access the unit. This mechanism can be
expected to be supported by a wide range of CORBA prod-
ucts.
Communications Contents Security:
In TINA, all service contents information is delivered by
streams. (There is an ongoing discussion also to allow
to provide contents information via operational interfaces
without relying on streams. However, the following is also
valid for such a delivery of contents.) Until now, CORBA
does neither support streams nor stream protection. A DPE
supporting streams must also support DPE security mecha-
nisms applicable to streams. The establishment of a stream
should include the establishment of a protection context for
the stream. This context determines the security mecha-
nisms and the key(s) used. The protection context is de-
rived from the cooperation security policy of both domains.
Such a policy, and possibly a session key, may already exist,
e.g., if both parties are in a user provider relationship. If the
parties have not authenticated each other directly (e.g., both
parties are users of a common provider) and want to estab-
lish end-to-end security, they can use the authentication ser-
vice mentioned above for direct mutual authentication and
the negotiation of a session key.
5. Conclusion
We analyzed and structured the TINA security problem
domain. It was demonstrated how the security services and
mechanisms can be provided as part of the DPE function-
ality. Ongoing conceptual work in CrySTINA is dedicated
to the identification and specification of the necessary sin-
gle security services, a formal model of how administrative
domains with different security policies agree on a coop-
eration security policy, and the use of a hierarchical public
key infrastructure based on certificates as specified in [8].
The approach to TINA security presented is implemented
extending the CORBA security features and using commer-
cial CORBA products. Future work will cover the addi-
tional trust relationship between the current user of a CPE
and the CPE itself that is needed for the support of personal
mobility with full security.
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